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Early in 2000, after a decade of economic expansion, 
growth began to slow in the United States. Over the 
ensuing months, the growth rates of gross domestic 
product began to decline simultaneously in many 
countries, including each of the large, advanced 
economies that constitute what is known as the Group 
of Seven (G-7)—Canada, France, Germany, Italy, 
Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 
The general slide in real (inflation adjusted) GDP 
growth seemed striking to many, and it fueled specu-
lation that a period was emerging in which broad 
movements in the economies of the industrialized 
countries would be more closely linked. 
[note: 1]. Discussions of this view appeared in the Washington Post, 
July 18, 2001, p. A1; the New York Times, August 20, 2001, p. A1, and 
November 25, 2001, p. A12; and the Economist, August 23, 2001, 
pp. 22-24. Also see Thomas Daalsgaard, Jorgen Elmeskov, and 
Cyn-Young Park, "Ongoing Changes in the Business Cycle— 
Evidence and Causes,'' Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), Economics Department Working Paper 315 
(2002); International Monetary Fund, "Business Cycle Linkages 
Among Major Advanced Economies,'' in World Economic Outlook 
(October 2001), pp. 65-79; International Monetary Fund, "Reces-
sions and Recoveries,'' World Economic Outlook (April 2002), 
pp. 104-37; OECD, OECD Economic Outlook, no. 70 (December 
2001), pp. 4-5, and no. 71 (June 2002), pp. 141-58. [end of note.] 
Proponents 
of this view argued that the increasing economic 
integration of the industrial economies brought about 
by greater trade in goods and financial markets was 
leading to a greater synchronization of national 
economies. 
If correct, the view that international growth rates 
are now more closely tied would have important 
implications for the making of national economic 
policies. With greater co-movement of GDP, for 
example, governments would need to take closer 
account of forecasts for conditions abroad in formu-
lating forecasts for their domestic economies. 
This article examines whether the links between 
U.S. growth and growth of the other G-7 countries 
have fundamentally changed. We first document the 
view that economic integration has increased mark-
edly in terms of international trade and the globali-
zation of financial markets. The degree to which 
these factors might be expected to increase the 
co-movement, or correlation, of economic growth 
among countries is, however, subject to debate. We 
turn next to characterizing the historical patterns in 
this correlation. Our analysis finds, indeed, that the 
estimated correlation of growth across the G-7 has 
been higher in the current downturn than during the 
expansion of the 1990s. However, rather than signal-
ing a future of permanently higher synchronization, 
this rise is typical of business cycles over the past 
thirty years. Estimated correlation fluctuates widely 
over time and has historically risen through U.S. 
recessions and fallen during expansions. Further-
more, estimates of correlation have not yet reached 
the peaks attained after earlier recessions. 
Although the correlation of growth rates among 
the G-7 economies does not appear dramatically dif-
ferent now than it was in earlier years, the variability 
of their growth rates over this period does seem to 
have generally declined. 
[note: 2]. Japan, which had a protracted period of slow growth during the 
1990s, is an exception to this conclusion. [end of note.] 
All else equal, a fall in 
variability would imply increased correlation among 
national growth rates. We discuss the offsetting 
changes that have left correlation largely unchanged. 
Overall, despite many changes in the international 
economy, the evidence does not reveal the arrival of a 
permanently higher correlation of growth rates 
among the G-7. 
WHY CORRELATION MAY HAVE CHANGED. 
The growth rates of national economies fluctuate 
through time, and the growth rates of the G-7 econo-
mies often move similarly to each other but not in 
lockstep (chart 1). Fluctuations in growth in any 
economy may arise because of changes in factors 
such as the productivity of labor and capital, eco-
nomic policy, business investment spending, and con-
sumption and savings decisions. These changes are 
called shocks to economic growth. Shocks can give 
rise to co-movements in growth among countries in two basic ways: through linkages among economies 
and through simultaneous incidence of the shocks. 
First, a shock arising in one country can be trans-
mitted through various economic and financial link-
ages to another country. Second, a shock may directly 
affect several countries at once; a widespread 
drought, for example, might cause a simultaneous fall 
in agricultural output in many countries, even in the 
absence of any linkages across borders. 
Chart 1. Change in real GDP in the United States, and the average change in the other G-7 countries, 1971 -2002:Q1 
NOTE. The data are quarterly and change is for four quarters. The Group of 
Seven (G-7) countries are Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States. Shaded bars are periods of recession in the 
United States as defined by the National Bureau of Economic Research 
(NBER). Although the shaded bar for the most recent recession ends at 
December 2001, the NBER has not, as of this writing, chosen an end-date for 
that recession. 
SOURCE. Here and in the following charts, GDP data are from Haver 
Analytics. 
[graph plotting two lines: United States and Other G-7. In 1971 US is about 2.5% and Other about 3.5%. They tend up and in 1973 US is about 7.5%  and other about 7%. Then they fall, reaching the recession starting late 1973 at about 4% for the US and 5.5% for other. They end the recession early  1975 with US at about -2.5% and other about -0.5%. In 1976 US is up to about 6.2%, other about 4.8%. They start the recession early 1980 with US  at about 1.5%, other about 4%. They end the recession mid 1980 with US about -1.5%, other about 0.8%. The recession starting mid 1981 has US  at about 4%, other at about 1.7%. In this recession about the middle of 1982 US hits a maximum low of about -3%. They end the recession the end of  1982 with US at about -1.8%, other about 0.5%. In 1984 US is up to about 8.2%, other about 3.7%. They start the recession mid 1990 with US at  about 2% and other at about 3.2%. They end the recession early 1991 with US at about -1.5%, other about 1%. 1992 through 2000 US fluctuates  between about 2 and 4.8%, other between about 0 and 4%. In 2000 US is about 4.8%, other about 3.9%. They hit the recession starting early 2001  with US at about 1.5%, other at about 2.3%. They reach the end of 2001 with US at about 1.5% and other about 0.1%.] 
The reasons that the correlation of economic 
growth across nations could increase can also be 
grouped into two types concerning linkages and 
simultaneous incidence. First, the structure of the 
world economy could change so that shocks affecting 
one or more economies are transmitted more strongly 
to other economies. The proponents of the view that 
rising economic integration has increased correlation 
have this reason in mind. A second possibility is 
that, although the cross-border transmission of shocks 
is unchanged, the frequency of global shocks has 
increased or the sensitivity of national economies to 
those shocks has risen. In this section, we review the 
reasoning behind each of these two sources of change 
in correlation. 
Increased Cross-Border Transmission of Shocks. 
The links among the economies of the G-7 grew 
steadily over the final decades of the twentieth cen-
tury. Each G-7 country except Japan has shown an 
increase in merchandise trade with its G-7 partners 
over the period since 1970 (chart 2). As a percentage 
of its own GDP, Canada's trade with its G-7 partners 
more than doubled, from about 30 percent to more 
than 60 percent, with much of the rise coming after 
the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement in 1989. 
Although G-7 trade as a share of GDP is lower in the 
other countries than in Canada, trade shares have 
nonetheless generally risen. The U.S. share rose from 
about 5 percent to about 9 percent over the period, 
and each of the European G-7 nations have now 
reached shares of about 20 percent. 
Financial integration has also increased. For exam-
ple, the share of foreign equities in U.S. equity port-
folios rose from less than 2 percent in the early 1980s 
to almost 12 percent in 2001 (chart 3). The share 
of U.S. equities in foreign equity portfolios has also 
risen a great deal over the period. other measures 
of international financial market integration show a 
similar pattern of increase. 
[note: 3]. International Monetary Fund, ''Business Cycle Linkages Among 
Major Advanced Economies,'' in World Economic Outlook (october 
2001), pp. 65-79; International Monetary Fund, "Recessions and 
Recoveries,'' World Economic Outlook (April 2002), pp. 104-37. [end of note.] 
A common presumption is that as trade and finan-
cial market integration increases among nations, their 
economic growth will become more synchronized. 
one standard argument about why a rise in goods 
trade would increase correlation is straightforward: 
When a surge in demand raises the growth rate in one 
country, some of the increase in demand will be for 
imported goods and thereby tend to raise the growth 
rate of that country's trading partners. 
openness to trade brings other changes that could 
decrease correlation, however. For example, one of 
the primary benefits of trade according to economic 
theory is that it allows each country to specialize in areas of production in which it has a compara-
tive advantage relative to its trading partners. With 
increased trade, therefore, nations could come to 
specialize in certain types of production, relying on 
imports to meet demand for other products. If differ-
ent types of production are subject to different kinds 
of shocks, then trade-related specialization could 
decrease growth correlations. 
[note: 4]. Paul Krugman develops this argument in his ''Lessons of Massa-
chusetts for EMU,'' in Francisco Torres and Francesco Giavazzi, eds., 
The Transition to Economic and Monetary Union (Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 1993), pp. 241-69. [end of note.] 
Trade in goods could 
decrease output correlations for other reasons as 
well. 
[note: 5]. One such reason is that, if countries experience different produc-
tivity shocks, increased trade in investment goods can help shift 
productive capital to more productive countries, magnifying the effects 
of different shocks. Regarding this effect and also the role that vertical 
integration can play in raising correlation, see M. Ayhan Kose and 
Kei-Mu Yi, "International Trade and Business Cycles: Is Vertical 
Specialization the Missing Link?'' American Economic Review, 
vol. 91 (May 2001), pp. 371-75. [end of note.] 
2. Trade (exports plus imports) of each G-7 country with 
the rest of the G-7 as a share of its own GDP, 1970-2000 
[graph plotting 7 lines: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United  Kingdom, and United states. Canada goes from about 30% in 1970 to about  64% in 2000. France goes from about 11.5% in 1970 to about 22.5% in  2000. Germany goes from about 12% in 1970 to about 22% in 2000.  Italy goes from about 13.5% in 1970 to about 20% in 2000. Japan goes from  about 7.5% in 1970 to about 6% in 2000. United Kingdom goes from about  11% in 1970 to about 20% in 2000. United states goes from about 5% in  1970 to about 9% in 2000.] 
NOTE. The data are annual. Imports, exports, and GDP are in current U.S. 
dollars at current exchange rates. 
SOURCE. International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics 
(various issues); Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 
3. Share of foreign equities in equity holdings of U.S. 
residents and share of U.S. equities in equity holdings 
of residents of foreign countries, 1980-2002:Q1 
[graph plotting two lines: Foreign holdings of U.S. residents and  U.S. holdings of foreign residents. In 1980, U.S. holdings was  about 4%, Foreign holdings about 1.5%. From 1981 to 1984 U.S.  holdings varied between about 6 and 7.5%, foreign holdings  about 1 to 2%. Then U.S. holdings started dropping and foreign  holdings started rising , they both were about 4% at the end of 1987.  u.s. holdings hit a low of about 2.75% in 1989 while foreign holdings  continued to rise. By 1992, U.S. holdings were about 5%, foreign  holdings about 6.25%. By 1994 U.S. Holdings was about 3.5%, while  foreign holdings rose to about 11.5%. From 1994 though 2002  foreign holdings varied between about 10 and 12%, ending at about  11.75%. U.S. holdings kept rising, surpassing foreign in 2001 and  ending at about 13.5% in 2002.] 
SOURCE. International Finance Corporation; International Federation of 
Stock Exchanges; Federal Reserve Board. 
Similarly, increases in financial integration have an 
ambiguous implication, at least theoretically, for the 
international correlation of growth rates. On the one 
hand, if equities of a given country are widely held 
around the world, a fall in the country's stock market 
will simultaneously decrease the wealth of consum-
ers in many nations, potentially increasing the corre-
lation in consumer demand and investment, and 
hence, GDP growth around the world. On the other 
hand, international diversification of investment port-
folios, like increased trade in goods, could contribute 
to the specialization in production among national 
economies, which, as noted above, could decrease 
output correlations. 
[note: 6]. For example, production specialization involves risks both to the 
owners and the employees of the firms. To the extent that these risks 
can be reduced through diversification in asset markets, one might 
expect greater specialization. For other examples of ambiguous effects related to increased capital mobility, see Jeffrey Frankel, "Ambiguous 
Policy Multipliers in Theory and in Empirical Models,'' in Ralph 
Bryant, Dale Henderson, Gerald Holtham, Peter Hooper, and Steven 
Symansky, eds., Empirical Macroeconomics for Interdependent 
Economies (Brookings Institution, 1988), pp. 17-26. [end of note.] 
While trade in goods and assets are the main ways 
that economic integration is measured, some analysts 
have also speculated about less tangible forms of 
integration that could affect output correlation. For 
example, some have argued that consumer and inves-
tor sentiment in nations across the globe may be more 
linked now than in the past because of, say, advances 
in global telecommunications. Because sentiment and 
its effect on the economy are notoriously hard to 
measure, this factor is highly speculative. 
Some empirical studies provide clearer guidance, 
however, regarding the net effect of integration on 
the correlation of growth rates. These studies com-
pare the correlation of GDP growth of regions within 
a country with similarly situated regions across 
national boundaries. Because regions within a coun-
try are usually quite highly integrated, these compari-
sons shed light on how integration affects correlation. 
Such comparisons consistently show that regions 
within countries have more highly correlated output 
growth than do national economies or similarly situ-
ated regions across national boundaries. 
[note: 7]. This result seems to hold when controlling for factors such 
as size of the economies, distance between the areas compared, and 
policy differences. See, for example, Tamim Bayoumi and Barry 
Eichengreen, "Shocking Aspects of European Monetary Integration,'' 
in Francisco Torres and Francesco Giavazzi, eds., Adjustment and 
Growth in the European Monetary Union (Cambridge University 
Press, 1993); and Todd Clark and Eric van Wincoop, ''Borders and 
Business Cycles,'' Journal of International Economics, vol. 55 (Octo-
ber 2001), pp. 59-85. [end of note.] 
Despite the ambiguities of theory, these empirical 
results have led most observers to conclude that 
increasing economic integration to the level found 
within national borders generally has a net positive 
effect on output growth correlation. But a separate 
question is whether the economic integration of the 
United States and the other G-7 nations has changed 
enough in, say, the past ten to fifteen years to gener-
ate a pronounced increase in correlation. We know of 
no clear evidence that changes of the magnitude we 
have observed would significantly raise the correla-
tion of U.S. economic growth with that of the rest of 
the G-7. 
[note: 8]. Most estimates of the effect of small increases in trade intensity 
on output correlation are similarly small. See Jeffrey Frankel and 
Andrew Rose, "The Endogeneity of the Optimum Currency Area 
Criteria,'' Economic Journal, vol. 108 (July 1998), pp. 1009-25; 
Fabio Canova and Harris Dellas, "Trade Interdependence and the 
International Business Cycle,'' Journal of International Economics, 
vol. 34 (February 1993), pp. 23-47; and Clark and van Wincoop, 
''Borders and Business Cycles.'' [end of note.] 
A Change in the Nature of Shocks. 
Even without increased integration, the correlation 
of economic growth across nations would rise if the 
type of shock that leads to common movements 
(''common shock'') becomes more prominent or if 
country-specific shocks become less prominent. 
Common shocks could become more ''prominent'' in 
either or both of two ways: (1) if the size or fre-
quency of the shocks increases and (2) if the sensitiv-
ity of national economies to the shocks increases. 
A textbook example of a common shock is a rise 
in the world price of oil, which might be expected to 
cause a synchronized decline in output growth around 
the world. The synchronized decline in output growth 
in the United States and the other G-7 countries in 
the mid-1970s (see chart 1) is often attributed to the 
sharp rise in world oil prices at that time. Similarly, 
oil price increases may have played a role in the 
recent downturn—for example, the spot price of oil 
as measured by the price of a barrel of West Texas 
intermediate crude rose from just under $11 in 
December 1998 to more than $34 in March 2000. 
[note: 9]. For an argument that oil shocks are central in explaining reces-
sions, see James Hamilton, ''What is an Oil Shock?'' University 
of California at San Diego (2000). A contrary view is provided 
by Robert B. Barsky and Lutz Kilian, "Do We Really Know that 
Oil Caused the Great Stagflation? A Monetary Alternative,'' NBER 
Macroeconomics Annual 2001 (MIT Press, 2002). [end of note.] 
The global decline in the value of information tech-
nology stocks beginning in early 2000 has also been 
cited as a common shock contributing to the current 
recession. 
As explanations for high correlation, more com-
plete economic integration and increased promi-
nence of common shocks differ in an important way. 
Because increased integration is probably here to 
stay, we would expect any of its effects on correlation 
to be long lasting. But if correlation is currently high 
because of common shocks, we would expect the 
high degree of correlation to persist only as long as 
the common shocks continue. A brief period in which 
common shocks are more prominent might lead to 
temporarily high correlation with few implications 
for the future. Sharp increases in the world price 
of oil, for example, played an important role in the 
economics of the 1970s and early 1980s but have 
been less prominent since then. 
A less obvious source of increased correlation is 
a decrease in the prominence of idiosyncratic 
shocks—shocks affecting only one country. This 
source can be understood by looking at the formal 
definition of the correlation of growth rates, which is 
the covariance of the growth rates divided by the product of the standard deviations of each of the two 
growth rates (see box ''Correlation as a Measure of 
Co-movement''). The standard deviation of a growth 
rate is a measure of its total variation. A decline in 
the prominence of idiosyncratic shocks in a country 
lowers the standard deviation of the country's eco-
nomic growth. If, at the same time, common varia-
tion as measured by covariance is unchanged, then 
correlation rises. 
[beginning of box:] Correlation as a Measure of Co-movement. 
Correlation of growth of A and B = 
Covariance of A and B over 
Standard deviation of A times Standard deviation of B. 
Covariance in growth of countries A and B is a measure of 
the common variability in growth of A and B. 
Standard deviation of growth of country A is a measure of 
the variability of growth of country A. 
Correlation can be viewed as the ratio of total common 
variation (covariance) in the two growth rates to a measure 
of total variation (the product of the standard deviations). 
The correlation between two variables is a number between 
-1 and 1. A positive correlation between growth in coun-
tries A and B means that when growth is strong in coun-
try A it also tends to be strong in country B. A negative 
correlation means that when growth is strong in country A, 
growth tends to be weak in B. The magnitude of correlation 
is one measure of the degree of association between the 
growth of A and B. A correlation of 1 between A and B 
means that the growth rates of the countries move entirely 
in lockstep. A correlation of zero means that growth in the 
two countries is unrelated; correlation of 1/2 implies moder-
ate association. [end of box.] 
The case of reduced prominence of idiosyncratic 
shocks is important to emphasize for two reasons. 
First, although an increase in correlation is com-
monly interpreted as an increase in the amount of 
common variation in the economies, an increase in 
correlation can also come, as just noted, from a 
decrease in idiosyncratic variation. To take an exam-
ple, the growth rate of a country that follows erratic 
fiscal and monetary policies will become more corre-
lated with the growth of other nations if it moves to a 
more stable policy. The rise in correlation in this case 
does not come from greater transmission of shocks or 
more prominent common shocks; rather, sources of 
common variation are unchanged, but idiosyncratic 
variation has been reduced. A rise in the correlation 
of economic growth rates due to an increase in com-
mon shocks and a rise due to a decrease in idiosyn-
cratic shocks have different implications for public 
policy: A rise in correlation because of a greater 
prominence of adverse common shocks would be a 
matter for concern, but a rise in correlation because 
of a reduction in adverse idiosyncratic shocks would 
be beneficial. 
The second reason to emphasize the case of idio-
syncratic shocks is that it highlights the importance 
of a change in standard deviation for the measure 
of correlation (recall that a decline in idiosyncratic 
shocks reduces standard deviation). A consensus is 
growing that the standard deviation of economic 
growth in the United States has been falling in recent 
years. 
[note: 10]. See, for example, Margaret McConnell and Gabriel Perez-
Quiros, ''Output Fluctuations in the United States: What Has Changed 
Since the Early 1980's?'' American Economic Review, vol. 90 
(December 2000), pp. 1464-76; James Kahn, Margaret McConnell, 
and Gabriel Perez-Quiros, ''The Reduced Volatility of the U.S. Econ-
omy: Policy or Progress?'' Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
(2001); James Stock and Mark Watson, '' Has the Business Cycle 
Changed and Why?'' NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2002 (MIT 
Press, forthcoming); Shaghil Ahmed, Andrew Levin, and Beth Anne 
Wilson, ''Recent U.S. Macroeconomic Stability: Good Policies, Good 
Practices, or Good Luck?'' International Finance Discussion 
Paper 730 (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, July 
2002); Chang-Jin Kim, Charles Nelson, and Jeremy Piger, ''The Less 
Volatile U.S. Economy: A Bayesian Investigation of Timing, Breadth, 
and Potential Explanations,'' International Finance Discussion 
Paper 707 (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 
August 2001); M. V. Cacdac Warnock and Francis E. Warnock, "The 
Declining Volatility of U.S. Employment: Was Arthur Burns Right?'' 
International Finance Discussion Paper 677 (Board of Governors of 
the Federal Reserve System, August 2000); Olivier Blanchard and 
John Simon, ''The Long and Large Decline in U.S. Output Volatility,'' 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2001, pp. 135-64; Thomas 
Helbling and Tamim Bayoumi, "G-7 Business Cycle Linkages 
Revisited,'' International Monetary Fund (2002). [end of note.] 
Indeed, evidence suggests that the standard 
deviation of U.S. growth has fallen one-third or more 
since the early 1980s. The source of this reduction is 
not evident, but some of its implications for correla-
tion are clear. If the covariance of U.S. growth with 
other nations is unchanged, the one-third reduction in 
the standard deviation of U.S. growth would imply 
that the correlation of U.S. growth with that of every 
other nation would be 50 percent greater than its 
earlier value. 
[note: 11]. Multiplying a standard deviation in the denominator of the 
correlation definition by 2/3 implies that correlation is 3/2 of, or is 
50 percent greater than, its former level. [end of note.] 
If correlation has not risen so dramati-cally, then either the covariance between the United 
States and other countries has decreased, or the stan-
dard deviation of growth abroad has increased, or 
both. 
Summary. 
The most obvious explanation for an increase in the 
correlation of growth would probably be that link-
ages among economies have increased and, thus, 
ups and downs in one economy are now transmitted 
more to other economies. However, two other 
explanations—an increased prominence of common 
shocks or a decreased prominence of idiosyncratic 
shocks—may be at least as important in explaining 
changes in correlation. 
THE CORRELATION OF 
U.S. AND FOREIGN G-7 GROWTH. 
In this section, we analyze estimates of correlation 
of U.S. economic growth with that of the other G-7 
nations. The behavior of the average foreign G-7 
growth rate is representative of the behavior of the 
data for each of the six countries, but it masks some 
important differences. After considering the average, 
we turn to the correlation of U.S. growth with each 
other country individually. 
Using standard formulas, an estimate of correlation 
can be computed over any time period. An analy-
sis that compares average correlations over selected 
time periods supports the view that correlation has 
increased recently. This analysis estimates the corre-
lation between U.S. quarterly growth in GDP and the 
average of quarterly growth for the other G-7 coun-
tries over three subperiods between 1970 and 2002: 
the most recent 2 1/2 years for which data are available 
(1999:Q4 to 2002:Q1) and each half of the earlier 
part of the sample period (chart 4). 
[note: 12]. The first quarterly GDP level used is for 1970:Q1, and hence 
the first quarterly growth value is for 1970:Q2. [end of note.] 
For the entire 
period from 1970:Q2 to 2002:Q1, the correlation in 
growth rates is 0.44 (value not shown in chart). The 
estimated correlation is considerably higher in the 
recent 2 1/2 years (0.55) than in the first or second 
halves of the earlier sample (0.43 and 0.28 respec-
tively). However, comparing the recent correlation 
estimate calculated over a brief period to earlier 
estimates calculated over much long periods may 
give a false impression that the recent rise is unique. 
The possibility that the recent level may merely 
reflect a historically normal fluctuation could be hid-
den in the earlier estimates formed over longer 
periods. 
[note: 13]. These data include the 2002 annual August revision to GDP for 
the United States. Data for the most recent recession in the United 
States as well as in the rest of the G-7 are subject to still further 
revision. [end of note.] 
Chart 4. Correlation of change in real GDP in the United States 
with the average change in the other G-7 countries, 
selected periods, 1970-2002 
[bar graph of the correlation coefficient in 1970 Q2  through 1984 Q4, 1985 Q1 through 1999 Q3, and  1999 Q4 through 2002 Q1. In 1970 Q2 through 1984 Q4  the correlation coefficient was about .425. In 1985 Q1  through 1999 Q3 it was about .3. In 1999 Q4 through  2002 Q1 it was about .55.] 
NOTE. The data are quarterly and change is quarterly. 
The Historical Pattern of Estimated 
Correlation. 
One way to show a more reliable picture is to plot the 
correlation estimated for overlapping (or ''rolling'') 
five-year periods that start in 1970:Q2 and roll for-
ward one quarter at a time. Thus, the correlation 
estimated for 1975:Q1 is calculated over the five 
years (twenty quarters) beginning in 1970:Q2 and 
ending in 1975:Q1. 
Measuring correlation over a series of rolling five-
year periods (chart 5, upper panel) gives a more 
detailed depiction of correlation over the past thirty 
years—and one that is much different from that in 
chart 4. Estimated correlation fluctuates a great deal 
over the period, ranging from a high of 0.80 to a low 
of -0.23. In the mid-1970s, mid-1980s, and early 
1990s, the estimated correlation consistently rises 
and reaches a local maximum within the five years of 
the end of a recession, so that the five-year period of 
data used in calculating the correlation contains the 
recession period. 
[note: 14]. The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) is a 
nonpartisan research institution that determines the beginnings (busi-
ness cycle peaks) and ends (business cycle troughs) of recessions— 
periods when economic activity actually declines. More information 
about how the NBER chooses business cycle dates is available on its 
web site at www.nber.org. See also general note to chart 1. [end of note.] 
These local maximums are quite high (above 0.70). Between each of the periods 
of high correlation have been brief periods in which 
estimated correlation is negative. 
Although the recent correlations shown in both 
chart 4 and chart 5 are relatively high, chart 5 shows 
that, earlier in the period, correlation reached even 
higher levels than it has of late. The recent pattern of 
increase around the time of a U.S. recession seems 
roughly in line with historical experience. Indeed, 
if any change in correlation is evident, it is a slight 
downward trend over the whole period. Hence, we 
see little evidence of a period of permanently higher 
correlation in these data. 
chart 5. Summary measures of change in real GDP in the 
United States and the average change in the other G-7 
countries, rolling five-year periods, 1975-2002:Q1 
[graph with three panels: top panel: correlation, middle panel standard  deviation, bottom panel covariance.]  [top panel: correlation. In 1975 it ends a recession with a correlation  coefficient of about .5. In 1976 it is up to about .8. It starts dropping  again and hits a low of about -.05 in 1980 when a recession starts. By the  end of the recession mid 1980 it is up to about .4. It drops a little and  enters the next recession in mid 1981 at about .3. It rises and ends the  recession in the end of 1982 at about .55. In 1985 it is about .7 and then  drops, hitting a low of about -.05 in 1989. Up again starting the recession  mid 1990 at about .375, and ending it the beginning of 1991 at about .7.  Then back down, hitting a maximum low of about -.25 in 1999, then  in the recession starting at the beginning of 2001 it is about 0, at the end  of the recession the end of 2001 it was about .4.] 
[middle panel: standard deviation. Plotting two lines: United States and  Other G-7. In 1975 they end a recession with a standard deviation of  about 4.9 for the US and 3.7 for other. In the beginning of 1980 is another  recession, US is at about 3.6 and other about 2. They come out of the  recession mid 1980 with US about 4.6, other about 2.7. Mid 1981 is  another recession, US is about 4.8, other about 2.5. The recession ends  the end of 1982 with US about 5.3 and other about 2.4. The tend  downwards, hitting the recession of mid 1990 at about 1.8 for both of them.  They end the recession the beginning of 1991 with US at about 2.5, other  about 1.8. The recession beginning early 2001 the US is at about 2, other  about 1. The end of the recession at the end of 2001 the US is about 2.4,  other about 1.4.] 
[bottom panel: covariance. In 1975 it ends a recession with a covariance  of about 9.25. It hits a maximum high of about 12.25 in 1976. Drops a  lot, hitting the recession beginning early 1980 at about -.5. the end of  the recession mid 1980 it is about 4.5. It starts the recession mid 1981  at about 3.5, and ends it the end of 1982 at about 6.25. It goes down and  hits 0 in 1989. The recession mid 1990 it is around 1, and ends the  recession the beginning of 1991 at about 3. Starts the recession beginning  early 2001 at about 0, and ends it the end of 2001 at about 1.5.] 
NOTE. The data are quarterly and change is quarterly. Values for each 
quarter are calculated over the five years ending in that quarter. For 
description of shaded bars, see general note to chart 1. 
The Recent Record on Standard Deviations and 
Covariance in G-7 Growth. 
In contrast to the correlation data, the standard devia-
tions of U.S. growth and average foreign G-7 growth 
show a clear pattern of change (chart 5, middle 
panel). As noted earlier, the standard deviation of 
U.S. GDP growth seems to have fallen sharply in the 
mid-1980s and has since fluctuated at less than
 2/3 of 
its former level. The standard deviation of foreign 
G-7 growth also appears to have fallen over this 
period. All else equal, the decline in the standard 
deviations of U.S. and foreign G-7 growth would 
imply a steady rise in correlation over the period, 
which we have not observed. Given the definition of 
correlation, the only other possibility is that covari-
ance also fell (chart 5, bottom panel). The decline in 
the U.S. standard deviation has been widely reported, 
but the reduction in the standard deviations of growth 
in the other G-7 nations and the contemporaneous fall 
in covariance with U.S. growth have received less 
notice. 
No consensus has emerged as to the source of 
these changes in standard deviation and covariance. 
Generally, the standard deviation in growth of a 
country will fall if some source of variation is 
removed; covariance between the growth rates of two 
countries will fall at the same time if some of the 
variation that is being removed is common variation. 
Correlation will be roughly unchanged if the decrease 
in standard deviation is attributable in roughly even 
proportions to declines in common and idiosyncratic 
variation, so that the share of variation that is com-
mon is unchanged. 
Three explanations have been advanced as possible 
causes of the recent reductions in standard deviation 
and covariance. The first is a decreased prominence 
of common shocks. A reduction in the frequency of 
oil price shocks or in the G-7 economies' response to 
those shocks, for example, would remove a common 
source of variation in G-7 economies and thereby 
potentially reduce both the standard deviations and 
covariance. But because this change falls mainly on 
common variation, it would tend to lower correlation. 
The second development is improvements in 
inventory management. If businesses worldwide are 
using advances in information technology to better manage inventories, they may thereby ameliorate one 
source of variability in output growth. Better inven-
tory management might be expected to reduce the 
effects both of common shocks and of idiosyncratic 
shocks and hence might be expected to have neutral 
implications for correlation. 
The third commonly discussed possibility is that 
improved government policy since the early 1980s 
has facilitated more steady growth. Proponents of 
this view note, for example, that inflation in the G-7 
economies has generally been lower and less variable 
recently than it was in the 1970s and early 1980s. As 
with better inventory management, improved man-
agement of national economies might tend to have 
neutral implications for correlation because it could 
moderate growth variability due both to common and 
to idiosyncratic shocks. 
The importance of these factors in explaining 
the fall in the standard deviations and covariances of 
growth in the G-7 is unresolved. The search for 
additional explanations continues. 
[note: 15]. One further example of an alternative explanation is that a 
reduction in capital market imperfections might have lessened the 
effects of shocks on the economy. For a discussion of these and other 
explanations, see the articles cited in note 10. [end of note.] 
Although the causes remain uncertain, the fall in 
the standard deviations and covariances of growth 
rates complicates the task of detecting other influ-
ences on correlation. A small and gradual change in 
correlation due to ongoing gradual changes in inte-
gration, for example, could easily be hidden by other 
effects that are changing the numerator and denomi-
nator of correlation. 
Overall, we reach the following conclusions from 
our analysis. Over the period since 1970, estimated 
correlation of GDP growth between the United States 
and the other G-7 countries has fluctuated, reaching 
peaks after recessions in the United States. Recent 
high levels of correlation are consistent with this 
overall pattern. Nonetheless, drawing conclusions 
about correlation is complicated by the fact that the 
standard deviations of growth in the United States 
and in the foreign G-7 seem to have declined. The 
effect of the decline of standard deviations on the 
correlation of growth has been roughly offset by a 
decrease in the covariance of U.S. growth with that of 
the other G-7 economies. In light of these facts, the 
evidence does not provide support for the view that 
increasing integration has fundamentally raised the 
correlation of U.S. growth with growth in the other 
G-7 economies. In the following sections, we subject 
these basic conclusions to various challenges. 
Comparing the United States with Each of the 
Other G-7 Countries. 
Again using a five-year rolling interval and quarterly 
data for the past thirty years, we examined the corre-
lation of growth in real GDP in the United States 
with the growth of each of the other G-7 econo-
mies. 
[note: 16]. The conclusions regarding Germany must be viewed with 
caution because of the GDP measurement issues surrounding German 
unification. Our growth rate data for Germany are for the former West 
German area through 1991 and for unified Germany thereafter. [end of note.] 
The analysis shows that the correlation with 
five of the six other countries is generally positive 
(chart 6) and has neither a clear upward nor down-
ward trend over the whole sample period. Japan is the 
exception, having had a persistently negative corre-
lation with the United States since the early 1990s 
as Japanese economic growth slumped and the U.S. 
economy boomed. The correlation of each economy 
with the United States generally rises around the time 
of U.S. recessions. 
Although the most recent estimated correlations 
are higher than in the mid-1990s, none surpasses the 
peaks attained around the time of earlier recessions. 
In short, over the past thirty years, the U.S. economy 
has had a history of moving somewhat in tandem 
with those of the other G-7 countries, whether the six 
are viewed collectively or individually; the recent 
rise in co-movement is largely in line with that his-
tory and does not provide a basis for concluding that 
the recent rise in correlation signals a new period of 
permanently higher correlation. 
As noted, the correlation between the growth rates 
of two economies is the ratio of the covariance of 
the growth rates in the two countries divided by the 
product of their standard deviations. The standard 
deviation of quarterly growth in real GDP, not only 
for the United States but also for each foreign G-7 
economy except Japan, generally fell over the period 
(chart 7). While the decline in the U.S. standard 
deviation appears to have come mainly in a sharp 
drop in the early 1980s, the decline in much of the 
foreign G-7 seems to have been more gradual. Espe-
cially in the case of France, the decline is also smaller 
in magnitude. All else equal, this fall in standard 
deviation at home and abroad would raise the correla-
tion of U.S. growth with that of the foreign G-7. The 
estimated correlation between growth rates in the 
United States and the rest of the G-7 shows no sharp 
increase as standard deviations fell because the esti-
mated covariance between the U.S. and foreign G-7 
growth rates has also fallen (chart 8). Once again, the estimated covariance of growth rates with those 
in the United States are considerably lower from the 
mid-1980s onward when compared with the earlier 
period. 
Chart 6. Correlation of change in real GDP in the United States 
with the change in each of the other G-7 countries, 
rolling five-year periods, 1975-2002:Q1 
[graph plotting six lines: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and  United Kingdom. The graphs indicate the U.S. recessions with shaded  bars: First recession ending early 1975, second is from early 1980 to mid  1980, third is from mid 1981 to end of 1982. Fourth is from mid 1990 to  early 1991. Fifth is from early 2001 to end of 2001.]  [Canada started 1975 with a correlation coefficient of about .5. It spikes  in 1977 to about .7. It starts the second recession at about .1, ending at  about .4. It starts the third recession at about .4 and ends it at about .55.  It goes up to about .8 in 1986. Down to about .25 in 1989. It starts the  fourth recession at about .5, ends it at about .75. Down to about .1 in  1996. It starts the fifth recession at about .4, ends it at about .8.]  [France started 1975 with a correlation coefficient of about .25. In 1976  it goes up to about .5. It starts the second recession at about .3, ends it at  about .6. It starts the third recession at about .45 and ends at about .3. It  is down to about -.2 in 1985. It goes up to about .3 in the beginning of  the fourth recession, ends it at about .65. In 2000 it is down to about  -.15. It starts the fifth recession at about 0, ends it about .4.]  [Germany started 1975 with a correlation coefficient of about .1. In 1976  it jumped up to about .75. It starts the second recession at about 0, ends  it at about .25. It starts the third recession at about .25, ends at about .5.  It starts the fourth recession at about 0, ends it at about -.1. In 1995 it is  down to about -.4, by 1996 it is up to about .2. It goes through the fifth  recession keeping around .45.]  [Italy started 1975 with a correlation coefficient of about .2. By 1978 it  was up to about .4. It started the second recession at about .1, ended it at  about 0. It started the third recession at about 0, ended it at about .25. It  started the fourth recession at about .35, ended it about .5. It slips down  to about -.35 in 1999, starts the fifth recession at about -.25 and ends it  at about .15.]  [Japan started 1975 with a correlation coefficient of about .65. It entered  the second recession at about -.2, ended it at about .1. It entered the third  recession at about .25 ended it at about .45. It started the fourth recession  about 0, ended it at about .25. In 1995 it was down to about -.5. Up to  about 0 in 1997, then down to about -.5 in 2000. It starts the fifth recession  at about -.25 and ends it at about -.1.]  [United Kingdom started 1975 with a correlation coefficient of about .4.  It started the second recession at about 0, ended it at about .25. It passes  through the third recession staying at about .1. In 1984 it was up to about  .4, it was down to about -.5 in 1989. It started the fourth recession at about  0, ended it at about .55. It stayed around there until 1995, then is down to  about .05 by 1996. It starts the fifth recession at about .35, ends it at about  .4.] 
NOTE. See note to chart 5. 
Chart 7. Standard deviations of change in real GDP in each 
of the G-7 countries, rolling five-year periods, 
1975-2002:Q1 
[graph plotting six lines: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and  United Kingdom. The graphs indicate the U.S. recessions with shaded  bars: First recession ending early 1975, second is from early 1980 to mid  1980, third is from mid 1981 to end of 1982. Fourth is from mid 1990 to  early 1991. Fifth is from early 2001 to end of 2001. The six lines are  compared to the standard deviation of the United States that was  presented in chart 5, middle panel]  [Canada started 1975 with a standard deviation of about 4.8. It starts the  second recession at about 2.5, ends it at about 3. It starts the third  recession at about 3.2 and ends at 4. It goes up to about 5 in 1985. It  starts the fourth recession at about 3, ends it at about 4. It starts the fifth  recession at about 1.8, ends it at about 2.]  [France started 1975 with a standard deviation of about 3.5. It started the  second recession at about 1.8, ended it about 2.1. It went through the third  recession staying at about 2. It starts the fourth recession at about 1.9 ends  it at about 2. It starts the fifth recession at about 1.8 and ends about 1.9.]  [Germany started 1975 with a standard deviation of about 6.5. It goes down  to about 4.2 in 1976. It starts the second recession at about 5, ends it at  about 5.5. It starts third recession at about 5.5, ends about 4.5. It goes up  to about 6.2 in 1987. It starts the fourth recession at about 5.5, ends it at  about 5. It goes through the fifth recession staying at about 2.1.]  [Italy started 1975 with a standard deviation of about 5.3. It was up to about  6 in 1977. It started the second recession at about 3.9, ended it at about 4.  It started the third recession at about 3.9 and ended it at about 3.2. It started  the fourth recession at about 1.8 and ended it at about 2.3. It went through  the fifth recession staying at about 2.]  [Japan started 1975 with a standard deviation of about 6. It drops and goes  through the second recession keeping at about 2.1. It starts the third  recession at about 2.2 and ends it at about 2. It starts the fourth recession at  about 3.3 and ends it at about 3. Dips to about 2 in 1995. Passes through the  fifth recession keeping at about 5.3.]  [United kingdom started 1975 with a standard deviation of about 6.5. It  dropped to about 4.2 in 1979. It started the second recession at about 3.5  and ends it at about 3.8. It starts the third recession at about 3.8 and ends it  at about 3.7. It starts the fourth recession at about 2.2 and ends it at about  3.2. It passes through the fifth recession staying at about 1.] 
NOTE. See note to chart 5. 
Extensions and Limitations of the Central 
Conclusions. 
The evidence just presented on correlation was for 
a single measure of economic activity (GDP), one 
growth interval (quarterly), and one type of period 
for measuring correlation (five-year periods that roll 
forward one quarter at a time). Different conclusions 
might arise if one were to consider other ways of 
measuring the correlation of economic activity. To 
test the robustness of our basic conclusions, we 
examined thirty-six measures of correlation in activ-
ity by applying nine correlation measures (correla-
tions in quarterly growth, four-quarter growth, and 
a gap measure over two-and-one-half-year, five-year, 
and ten-year rolling periods) to four real economic aggregates: GDP, consumption, investment, and 
industrial production. 
[note: 17]. For any variable, the associated gap measure is defined as the 
logarithm of the variable minus the trend in the logarithm of the 
variable calculated using the Hodrick-Prescott filter. The trend calcu-
lated in this way fluctuates through time. [end of note.] 
Chart 8. Covariance of change in real GDP in the United States 
with the change in each of the other G-7 countries, 
rolling five-year periods, 1975-2002:Q1 
[graph plotting six lines: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and  United Kingdom. The graphs indicate the U.S. recessions with shaded  bars: First recession ending early 1975, second is from early 1980 to mid  1980, third is from mid 1981 to end of 1982. Fourth is from mid 1990 to  early 1991. Fifth is from early 2001 to end of 2001.]  [Canada started 1975 with a covariance of about 11. It starts the second  recession at about 1 and ends it at about 5. It starts the third recession at  about 5 and ends it at about 12. It peaks in 1984 at about 19. Down to  about 1 in 1989. Starts the fourth recession at about 2, ends it at about 7.  Down to about .5 in 1996. It starts the fifth recession at about 1 and ends  it at about 4.]  [France starts 1975 with a covariance of about 5. It begins the second  recession at about 2, ends it at about 5, It starts the third recession at about  4 and ends it at about 3, it drops to about -2 in 1985. It starts the fourth  recession at about 1 and ends it at about 3. Starts the fifth recession at  about 0, ends it at about 2.]  [Germany starts 1975 with a covariance of about 3. In 1976 it is up to  about 15. It starts the second recession at about 0, ends it at about 6. It  starts the third recession at about 5, ends it at about 11. Up to about 18 in  1984. It hits about -1 in 1989. It starts the fourth recession at about 1,  ends it at about -1. In 1995 it is about -4. It is up to about 1 in 1996 and  stays there until the fifth recession, going in at about 2 ending at about 2.5.]  [Italy starts 1975 with a covariance of about 5. In 1976 it is about 8, in  1979 it is about 10. It starts the second recession at about -1, ends it at  about 2. It starts the third recession at about -.5, ends it at about 5. Stays  between about 0 and 2 until the fourth recession, where it starts at about 1  and ends at about 2.5. Down to between about 1 and -1 until the fifth  recession where it starts at about -1, ends at about .5.]  [Japan starts 1975 with a covariance of about 20. It drops, entering the  second recssion at about -1 and ending it at about 1. It enters the third  recession at about 3 and ends it at about 5. Its about 0 from 1986 to the third  recession, which it starts at about 0 and ends at about 2. It reaches -2.5 in  1994. Enters the fifth recession at about -3, ends it at about -1.]  [United Kingdom starts 1975 with a covariance of about 12. In 1976 it is up  to about 16. It drops, starting the second recession at about 0, ending it at  about 7. It starts the third recession at about 4 and ends it at about 5. Goes  down to about -2 by 1987. Starts the fourth recession at about 0, ends it at  about 5. Stays around there until it stats dropping in 1996, when it is down  to about 0 and stays there until the fifth recession, starting it at about .5 and  ending it at about 1.] 
NOTE. See note to chart 5. 
Chart 9. Correlation of output gaps in the United States with the 
output gaps in each of the other G-7 countries, rolling 
five-year periods, 1975-2002:Q1 
[graph plotting six lines: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and  United Kingdom. The graphs indicate the U.S. recessions with shaded  bars: First recession ending early 1975, second is from early 1980 to mid  1980, third is from mid 1981 to end of 1982. Fourth is from mid 1990 to  early 1991. Fifth is from early 2001 to end of 2001.]  [Canada started 1975 with a correlation coefficient of about .75. It  started the second recession at about .8 and ended it about .7. It started  the third recession about .5 and ended it about .85. Stayed about .9 from  1983 to 1987, then a drop in 1988 to about .5. It starts the fourth recession  about .9, ends it about .95. In 1998 it is about .3. In the fifth recession it  stays at about .95]  [France started 1975 with a correlation coefficient of about .75. It started  the second recession at about .8 and ended it at about .7. It started the  third recession about .45 and ended it about .05. It dropped down to about  -.7 in 1985. In 1987 it starts rising again, reaching about .9 in 1989. It  enters the fourth recession at about .9 and ends it at about .5. It is down  to about -.4 in 1995, then goes up again, hitting the fifth recession at  about .75 and ending it at about .6.]  [Germany started 1975 with a correlation coefficient of about .65. In 1976  it went up to about 1. It started the second recession at about .8 and ended  it at about .6. It started the third recession at about .4 and ended at about  .75. It starts the fourth recession at about .25 and ends it at about -.3. It  goes down to about -.7 in 1992. Up to about .5 in 1998. Down to about  -.5 in 1999. It starts the fifth recession at about .6 and ends it at about .5.]  [Italy started 1975 with a correlation coefficient of about .25. In 1996 it  was up to about .5. It started the second recession at about .5 and ended  it at about .2. It started the third recession at about -.05 and ended it at  about .4. It went up to about .75 in 1984. In 1988 it was down to about .1.  It stated the fourth recession at about .9 and ended it at about .6. It went  down to about -.4 in 1995. Up to about .25 in 1997. Down to about -.4 in  1999. It started the fifth recession at about .25 and ended it at about .2.]  [Japan started 1975 with a correlation coefficient of about .7. In 1976 it  was up to about .9. It started the second recession at about .85 and ended  at about .8. It started the third recession at about .6 and ended it at about  .5. In 1986 it was down to about -.4. It went up again to about .85 in 1989.  It started the fourth recession at about .85, ended it at about .1. It was  down to about -.3 in 1992. Up to about .05 in 1993. Down to about -.75 in  1995. It started the fifth recession at about -.3, ended it at about .35.]  [United Kingdom started 1975 with a correlation coefficient of about .8.  It stayed at about .8 until the end of the second recession in 1980. It started  the third recession at about .6 and ended it at about .65. In 1985 it is  down to about 0. Up to about .4 in 1987. Down to abotu -.1 in 1988. It  started the fourth recession at about .4 and ended it at about .9. In 1991 it  is about 1. It is down to about 0 in 1999. It starts the fifth recession at  about .4 and ends it at about .6.] 
NOTE. For method of calculating the output gaps, see text note 17. See also 
note to chart 5. 
These alternative measures offer several potential 
insights. Both the output gap measure and the four-
quarter growth rate will capture longer-term move-
ments better than does the quarterly growth rate of 
GDP. By focusing on the correlation of output gaps, 
rather than the correlation of GDP growth, we may 
also better capture business cycle variation in these 
economies. Consumption and investment are of inter-
est because these broad components of GDP may be 
more subject to international linkages than is, say, the 
government spending component of GDP. Industrial 
production is more volatile than other components 
of output such as services. Further, industrial output 
is generally tradeable across borders. Thus, an 
increase in correlation due to economic integration 
might show up first in industrial production. With almost all of the thirty-six measures, we 
found that estimated correlation in the recent period 
has not exceeded the levels attained earlier in the 
sample. For example, the pattern of fluctuation of 
output gap correlations (chart 9) is somewhat differ-
ent from that of correlation in quarterly GDP growth. 
In particular, the correlation in output gaps does not 
rise as consistently during U.S. recessions. Still, the 
overall conclusion remains the same: Estimated cor-
relation fluctuates and has not recently exceeded ear-
lier peaks. We can summarize the results of all the 
measures in the following way: In only a few cases 
has correlation recently surpassed earlier peaks, usu-
ally by only a slight amount, and no clear or consis-
tent pattern of increased correlation emerges across 
countries or measures of correlation. 
Some analysts have cited a slight trend decline in 
the cross-sectional standard deviation of GDP growth 
in the G-7 economies over the period since the 1970s 
as evidence of a rise in the correlation of GDP 
growth (chart 10). 
[note: 18]. For any calendar quarter, the cross-sectional standard deviation 
of growth is the standard deviation of the growth rates of the seven 
G-7 countries in that quarter. [end of note.] 
This trend decline in cross-
sectional standard deviation could come from a rise 
in correlation—if growth were more correlated across 
countries, the individual growth rates should be less 
dispersed at any point in time. However, the cross-
sectional standard deviation will also fall if correla-
tion is constant and the individual standard deviations 
fall. Thus, the fall in the cross-sectional standard 
deviation is consistent with our basic conclusion that 
standard deviations have fallen while correlation has 
been roughly unchanged. 
Chart 10. Cross-sectional standard deviation of change in real 
GDP of the G-7, 1971-2002:Q1 
[graph. In 1971 the standard deviation was about 1.5. It jaggs a few  times through 1973 with a spread of about 1.5. End of 1973 i5 is about  1, beginning of 1974 it is about 4.25. Tending downwards with jaggs  of about a .5 spread reaching about .75 in 1977. Jaggs between 2.75  and 1 from 1977 to 1985. In 1986 it was down to about .5. It jaggs  between .5 and 1.5 until 1990, the end of which it jaggs up to about  3.5. In 1992 it is down to about .9. In 1993 through 1995 it stays about  1.75 to 1.4. End of 1995 it is down to about .3. Up again to about 2.4  in 1998. Down to about .6 in 2001. Ends the beginning of 2002 at  about 1.2.] 
NOTE. The data are quarterly and change is for four quarters. The 
cross-sectional standard deviation in any quarter is the standard deviation of 
the four-quarter change in all of the G-7 countries in that quarter. 
Finally, we highlight two limitations of our results. 
our many different measures of correlation of eco-
nomic activity among the G-7 countries produce basi-
cally consistent results, but those conclusions may or 
may not apply to the linkages between the United 
States and, say, emerging-market economies. Second, 
and more broadly, a change in the correlation of 
national economic growth rates is not likely to be 
visible unless the change is very large or has been in 
place for a decade or more. For example, if a modest 
permanent increase in correlation occurred in the late 
1990s, our tools would not discover it until the higher 
estimated correlation during the recent recession per-
sisted well into the future. 
SUMMARY. 
Various linkages among economies are becoming 
stronger. Trade-to-GDP ratios are rising, financial 
markets are becoming increasingly integrated, and 
advances in global telecommunications might cause 
less tangible factors, such as consumer and business 
confidence, to become more closely linked. No con-
sensus exists, however, as to how large an effect 
these factors should have on the correlation between 
GDP growth in the United States and in the other G-7 
nations. Furthermore, any effect of these factors on 
correlation would very likely be gradual. 
At this time, any changes in correlation due to 
increased integration do not show clearly in the data. 
The correlation of U.S. GDP growth with that of the 
foreign G-7 economies in the recent U.S. recession 
has been roughly in line with the experience around 
the time of earlier recessions. Estimated correlation 
has risen from its level during the previous expan-
sion, but not in a way that clearly distinguishes this 
recession from earlier ones. overall, we find no evi-
dence to indicate that the recent rise in correlation 
signals a future of permanently higher synchroniza-
tion of national growth rates. 
The most dramatic change over the period since 
the early 1980s seems to have been a fall in both the 
standard deviation of growth in most G-7 economies 
and a contemporaneous fall in the covariance of U.S. 
and foreign G-7 growth. The source of this change 
is the subject of ongoing debate. Possible expla-
nations include a decrease in the prominence of 
common shocks to the global economy, improved 
management techniques by firms, and a better macro-
economic policy environment. It remains to be seen 
how these factors, combined with continuing 
increases in economic integration, may affect the 
co-movement of U.S. economic growth with that of 
the other G-7 economies in the future. 